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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."1 To
the layperson "twice put in jeopardy" means twice tried. The
Supreme Court has firmly established, however, that the Double
Jeopardy Clause targets two kinds of multiplicity: multiple prosecu-
tions and multiple punishments. 2 The right against multiple punish-
ments is less commonly understood than the right against multiple
prosecutions. What does it mean to be punished twice for the same
offense? What is the evil that the right guards against?
The Court appears to have defined the prohibition in two ways.
For years, it explained the right as a guarantee that defendants will
suffer no greater punishment than that authorized by the legislature. 3
The idea underlying this approach is that legislatures define the scope
of punishments, 4 and thus, punishment in excess of this legislative
authorization is unconstitutionally "multiple." Until recently, the
Court seemed to have taken the position that legislative deference is
the only function of the right against multiple punishments. In 1989,
however, the Court held in United States v. Halpers that legislatively
authorized civil sanctions cannot be imposed in a separate proceeding
after the defendant has been prosecuted and punished.6 The Halper
Court thus seemed to define multiple punishments in terms of
proceedings rather than legislative maximums.
These two approaches to the multiple punishments prohibition
coexist uneasily. While the legislative deference model recognizes the
legislature's power to prescribe punishments, the separate
proceedings model effectively undermines that power by prohibiting
punishments within legislatively authorized maximums if they
happen to be imposed in separate proceedings. 7  Thus, some
1. U.S. Const., Amend. V. The clause is read broadly to apply to all criminal offenses,
not only to capital crimes or crimes involving corporal punishment. Wayne R. LaFave and
Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 1058-59 (West, 2d ed. 1992).
2. In 1873, the Supreme Court declared: "[W]e do not doubt that the Constitution was
designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as
from being twice tried for it." Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wallace) 163, 173 (1873).
3. See Part III.A,
4. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (stating that the legislature has the power
to "prescribe crimes and determine punishments").
5. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
6. Id. at 448-49.
7. See, for example, Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on
Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 126 (1995) (criticizing the Halper
Court for establishing limits on multiple punishments "that the legislature cannot circumvent");
Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues to Tinker with
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commentators have argued that the two models of multiple
punishments doctrine are fundamentally inconsistent.8 The Court's
focus on separate proceedings in Halper has also caused problems by
blurring the distinction between multiple punishments and multiple
prosecutions cases.9 Thus lower courts applying Halper awkwardly
import multiple prosecutions doctrine, creating even more confusion.1°
Some point to these problems as evidence that the Double
Jeopardy Clause should not be read to protect against multiple
punishments at all." The most vocal of these critics, Justice Scalia,
has described the multiple punishments prohibition as "one of those
areas" where the Court's jurisprudence "is not only wrong but
unworkable as well."'12
This Note suggests that a double jeopardy prohibition on mul-
tiple punishments is neither wrong nor unworkable. Rather, the
main problem with multiple punishments jurisprudence stems from
the Court's failure to identify a single double jeopardy interest under-
lying its various applications of the right. 3  While the Court
sometimes states what the prohibition does, it has not articulated
what it neans.14 The Court could achieve enhanced clarity by tying
its multiple punishments jurisprudence to the interest that the
Double Jeopardy Clause was originally designed to serve: the interest
in preserving the integrity of final judgments.
Under this formulation, courts may impose punishment to the
full extent authorized by the legislature in one judgment. Any pun-
Double Jeopardy, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 55-56 (1993) (arguing that the Halper Court under-
mined Congress's power to impose both civil and criminal sanctions for certain conduct).
8. See, for example, King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 113-23 (cited in note 7) (discussing the
"fundamental inconsistency" between the Court's "majoritarian" and "antimajoritariari" strands
of double jeopardy jurisprudence).
9, See Henning, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 7) ('Halper has obscured the
distinction between multiple penalty cases and successive prosecutions.").
10. See Part III.B.2.
11. See, for example, United States v. Ogbuehi, 897 F. Supp. 887, 890 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(noting that the Double Jeopardy Clause only provides the multiple punishment protection
through "judicial generosity"); Brian L. Summers, Note, Double Jeopardy: Rethinking the
Parameters of the Multiplicity Prohibition, 56 Ohio St. L. J. 1595, 1607-14 (1995) (arguing that a
right against multiple punishments should not be recognized as a component of double jeopardy
protection).
12. Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2209, 132 L. Ed. 2d 351, 368 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
13. To students of double jeopardy doctrine generally, this is a familiar criticism.
Professor Westen diagnosed the problem eloquently almost ten years before Halper: "[B]ecause
[the Court] never collectively focused on the values that inform the prohibition, they have no
common idea as to what the prohibition itself means; and not knowing what they mean by it,
they disagree on its application." Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy:
Reflections on Government Appeals of Crininal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1063 (1980).
14. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10.
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ishment that exceeds the scope of the first final judgment-by exceed-
ing either legislative limits or the limits set by the sentencing author-
ity 5  in the judgment itself-constitutes a second, or
unconstitutionally multiple, punishment. 16 This analysis places the
focus of the multiple punishments inquiry where it belongs-on
judgments of punishment, rather than on proceedings or legislative
maximums. If the criminal proceeding is the unit that defines
multiplicity in the multiple prosecutions context, it is only logical that
the lawful judgment of punishment is the corresponding
constitutional unit that defines multiplicity in the multiple punish-
ments context. By tying its various applications of multiple
punishments rules to the interest they serve, the Court could dissolve
many of the apparent anomalies and inconsistencies that currently
plague the Court's jurisprudence. Moreover, a clear identification of
the interest behind the multiple punishments prohibition would
provide much-needed guidance to the lower courts who must apply
the right.
Part II of this Note discusses double jeopardy interests and
argues that the multiple punishment prohibition, as originally con-
ceived, is consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause's primary pur-
pose of preserving the integrity of final judgments. Part III explores
the Court's two models of the multiple punishments prohibition and
discusses how the modern Court has failed to articulate a coherent
double jeopardy interest underlying either model. It demonstrates
how this failure has created a multiple punishments jurisprudence
that is confusing and apparently inconsistent. Part IV discusses the
Court's two models of the multiple punishments prohibition in light of
the interest in preserving the integrity of judgments. It concludes
that refocusing the prohibition on this interest would clarify the
Court's confusing jurisprudence and provide guidance to lower courts.
15. The function of punishing criminal defendants is essentially a judicial function. See
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989) (noting that sentencing lies "close to the
heart of the judicial function"). In a case reviewing the proportionality of a sentence to the
severity of the crime the Court stated: "[A]pplication of [proportionality] factors assumes that
courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale. In a broad
sense this assumption is justified, and courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as
legislatures must make them in the first instance." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
16. The final judgment of punishment represents the legitimate determination of pun-
ishment under the laws promulgated by the legislature and the sentencing authority of the
judiciary. Any punishment exceeding the limits set by either of those two bodies, therefore,
undermines the integrity of the judgment.
[Vol. 50:167
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II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY INTERESTS AND THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
PROHIBITION
The original purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to
preserve the integrity of final judgments. 17 A defendant could there-
fore not raise a double jeopardy claim unless a final judgment-either
of acquittal or conviction-had been rendered for the same offense.'8
After a final judgment, however, the defendant was said to have been
put in jeopardy. 9 The right against multiple prosecutions protected
defendants from "double jeopardy"-being prosecuted a second time
for the same offense 20 after either an acquittal or a conviction.2 1
The limited focus on the integrity of final judgments did not
last long. The Supreme Court soon recognized a "separate but related
interest" of defendants in avoiding the burdens of the prohibited
criminal proceedings themselves.2 2 This interest protects defendants
from the embarrassment, expense, stigma, and anxiety of facing more
than one confrontation with society on the question of guilt or
innocence. 23  Moreover, it guards against the danger of erroneously
convicting innocent defendants that is created by the sheer weight of
17. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
18. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978). The rule was based on the common law pleas of
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 262
n.1 (1965) ("The two ... pleas in bar, autrefois acquit (former acquittal) and autrefois convict
(former conviction) prevented reprosecution after a verdict.").
19. Bretz, 437 U.S. at 33.
20. The formula for determining when two statutory offenses are similar enough to
constitute the "same offense" is commonly known as the Blockburger test. Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (stating that two statutory provisions describe the same
offense unless each requires proof of a fact that the other does not). See United States v. Dixon,
509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which had estab-
lished a broader "same conduct" test for determining whether two provisions are the same
offense in the multiple prosecutions context). The multiple prosecutions prohibition acts as a
constitutional rule of compulsory joinder, requiring prosecutors to raise all offenses that are the
same under Blockburger in a single prosecution. See Comment, 95 Yale L. J. at 277-99 (cited in
note 18) (discussing the rationales for the multiple prosecutions prohibition's compulsory joinder
rule).
Although some would read the Double Jeopardy Clause's "same offense" requirement quite
literally, see, for example, Akhil Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After
Rodney King, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1995) (arguing that "the Double Jeopardy Clause means
what it says--'same' means 'same'"), the Supreme Court has long refuted such a narrow
reading. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977) ("It has long been understood that sepa-
rate statutory crimes need not be identical-either in constituent elements or in actual
proof-in order to be the same within the meaning of the [Double Jeopardy Clause].").
21. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
22. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92 ("Although the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause
was to protect the integrity of a final judgment, this Court has also developed a body of law
guarding the separate but related interest of a defendant in avoiding multiple prosecutions even
where no final determination of guilt or innocence has been made.") (citations omitted).
23. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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these burdens, along with the prosecutor's ability to rehearse her
case, in multiple criminal proceedings. 24 Thus the Court identified a
procedural finality interest implicated by the unique dangers inherent
in criminal prosecutions.15
Thus, although the interest commonly said to underlie the
protection is still the finality of "judgments,"'26 the Court has long held
that the multiple prosecutions prohibition takes effect before any final
judgment is reached. Jeopardy "attaches" at the outset of the trial
when the case is put to the trier of fact. 27 The prosecutor may not
institute separate criminal proceedings for the same offense, or un-
necessarily28 declare or induce a mistrial and reprosecute the defen-
dant for the same offense. 29 In addition, multiple prosecutions claims
are appealable before the second trial ends in a final judgment be-
cause it is the danger inherent in the procedure leading to the second
judgment that warrants the protection of the multiple prosecutions
prohibition. 30
The Supreme Court first held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects defendants from multiple punishments in Ex Parte Lange.31
Lange was charged with stealing mailbags, an offense punishable by a
maximum sentence of either one year in prison or a $200 fine.32 The
24. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 ('To permit a second trial.., would present an unacceptably
high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defen-
dant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty.") (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 188).
25. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (The Fifth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against placing a defendant 'twice in jeopardy' represents a constitutional policy of finality
for the defendant's benefit in ... criminal proceedings.").
26. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (stating that the interest in
finality of judgments is "a or the primary" interest behind the Double Jeopardy Clause);
Henning, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 7 (cited in note 7) (stating that in the retrial context "the
primary [double jeopardy] value is protecting the defendant's interest in the finality of the
verdicef').
27. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
28. See Comment, 75 Yale L. J. at 286-87 (cited in note 18) ('[Clourts have recognized
necessity when there is a breakdown of judicial machinery-when the first jury is hung, a juror
is disqualified, the trial judge dies, or war closes the courts.") (footnotes omitted).
29. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978) (stating that double jeopardy bars
a second prosecution if a mistrial is not supported by "manifest necessity"); Oregon v. Kennedy,
456 U.S. 667, 673-76 (1982) (holding that double jeopardy prohibits a second trial after a mis-
trial if the basis for the mistrial was prosecutorial or judicial conduct intended to prejudice a
defendant into moving for a mistrial); Green, 355 U.S. at 188 (noting that the rule prevents
prosecutors and judges from discontinuing the first trial and retrying the defendant when it
appears that the first jury might not convict).
30. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) ("[The rights conferred on a criminal
accused by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of
double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence.").
31. 85 U.S. (18 Wallace) 163 (1873).
32. Id. at 175.
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trial judge mistakenly sentenced Lange to one year's imprisonment
and s $200 fine. 33 Before the judge realized his error, the defendant
had already paid the fine and served five days of the prison
sentence. 34  The judge then vacated the original sentence, and
resentenced the defendant to one year's imprisonment. 3  The
Supreme Court reversed Lange's sentence, reasoning that imposing
the prison term would punish Lange twice for a single offense. 36 The
Court stated that the judge had no power to impose a prison sentence
when Lange had fully satisfied one of the maximum alternative
penalties prescribed by the legislature.37 The Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Court concluded, "was designed as much to prevent the
criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as being
twice tried for it."38
Lange thus presented the Court with the opportunity to firmly
locate the multiple punishments prohibition in the scheme of interests
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Yet the Lange Court did
not articulate any interest behind its new prohibition. The decision
clearly does not reflect the procedural finality interest that the Court
identified in its later double jeopardy decisions. The defendant was
not subjected to the burdens of a second prosecution. Nor did he
suffer the embarrassment, expense, stigma, or harassment of a
second criminal proceeding. Nor did he risk a second determination
of guilt. He was simply resentenced on the original verdict. What,
then, was the Lange Court seeking to protect the defendant against
by identifying this "multiple punishments" prohibition?
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. In fact, Lange had already endured punishment in excess of the maximum
authorized by the legislature since he had not only paid the maximum fine, but also served five
days in prison as well.
38. Id at 173.
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III. THE TWO MODELS OF MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
A. The Traditional Model: Punishments Defined
by Legislative Limits
Although Lange has been subjected to various readings, 39 the
Court has confined its interpretation of the decision to one limited
proposition-that double jeopardy in the multiple punishments
context prevents courts from imposing punishment in excess of that
authorized by the legislature. 40  The underlying rationale for this
proposition is that legislatures have the exclusive power to prescribe
the scope of punishments. 41
For example, a legislature can define a specific crime and pun-
ish it with two consecutive one-year prison terms, or it can achieve
the same effect by simply punishing the crime with a single two-year
sentence. Similarly, a legislature can impose both a fine and a prison
sentence for a single offense. Until Halper, as long as a punishment
did not exceed whatever the legislature had clearly authorized,'42 it did
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 43  Under this traditional
39. See, for example, George C. Thomas III, Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense-
The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter, 62 Wash. U. L. Q. 79 (1984). Professor Thomas describes
three possible multiple punishments violations in Lange: First, the original sentence exceeded
the maximum allowed by the legislature; second, Lange was resentenced after fully satisfying
one of two alternative penalties authorized; third, both sentences subjected Lange to greater
punishment than the legislature had authorized. Id. at 89.
40. See, for example, Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 383 (1989) (stating that
"Lange... stands for the uncontested proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
punishment in excess of that authorized by the legislature, and not for the broader rule sug-
gested by its dictum" and rejecting the argument that Lange requires a prisoner who has
satisfied the less severe of two alternative sentences to be released) (citation omitted). See also
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139 ("As Ex Parte Lange demonstrates, a defendant may not receive a
greater sentence than the legislature has authorized. No double jeopardy problem would have
been presented in Ex Parte Lange if Congress had provided that the offense there was punish-
able by both fine and imprisonment, even though that is multiple punishment.").
41. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (stating that the legislature has the power to "prescribe
crimes and determine punishments").
42. This view of the multiple punishments prohibition entitles defendants only to a pre-
sumption that the legislature did not intend to cumulate punishments for the same offense. If
two statutory provisions describe the same offense under the Blockburger test, the Double
Jeopardy Clause requires courts to presume that sentencing under both statutes would violate
the defendant's right against multiple punishments. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692
(1980). The presumption is justified on the ground that legislatures "ordinarily [do] not intend
to punish the same offense under two different statutes." Id. at 691-92. Accordingly, this
presumption is overcome when the legislature has "clearly authorized" cumulation of punish-
ment. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). If the legislature has clarified its inten-
tion to cumulate punishment, then the defendant cannot complain of "multiple" punishments.
43. Some commentators have presumed that the Blockburger test itself incorporates only
a rebuttable presumption that two statutes constitute the same offense. Under this interpreta-
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approach, the multiple punishments prohibition amounted to little
more than a separation of powers rule:" punishment only became
unconstitutionally "multiple" when courts usurped the power of the
legislature by imposing punishment exceeding legislatively authorized
limits.4 5
The notion that the multiple punishments prohibition
prohibits punishment in excess of legislatively authorized limits is
consistent with the original purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause-preserving the integrity of final judgments. A judgment of
punishment, after all, is only final insofar as the court has the power
to impose that punishment in the first place. To the extent that a
tion, even multiple prosecutions for the same offense would be permissible if the legislature had
clearly authorized both prosecutions since the Blockburger test controls the same offense issue
in both the multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments contexts. See, for example, King,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 118 (cited in note 7) (stating that when the Court in Dixon held the
Blockburger test applicable in both the multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments con-
texts, it "gave the go-ahead to government attorneys to cumulate prosecutions and punish-
ments... as long as the legislature had approved").
This perception overreads the Dixon holding. Dixon did not hold that legislative intent
governs the question of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause allows multiple prosecutions or
that a Blockburger finding of "same offense" is rebuttable by the legislature. Dixon only held
that the Blockburger test defined the sole constitutional meaning of "same offense" in the
multiple prosecutions context. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 703-04. In doing so, Dixon overruled Grady,
which adopted a more encompassing definition of same offense than the Blockburger test. See
Grady, 495 U.S. at 521-22 (adopting a "same conduct" test to define same offense). The Grady
Court regarded the Blockburger test as conclusive, rather than rebuttable, yet found it
inadequate to protect defendants without an additional test:
If application of [Blockburger] reveals that the offenses have identical statutory ele-
ments or that one is a lesser included offense of the other, then the inquiry must cease,
and the subsequent prosecution is barred. The State argues that this should be the last
step in the inquiry and that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits successive prosecutions
whenever the offenses charged satisfy the Blockburger test. We disagree.
Id. at 516 (citing Brown, 432 U.S. at 166).
Even Justice Scalia, one of Grady's harshest critics and author of the Dixon opinion, appears
to assume that Blockburger is a conclusive, not rebuttable, definition of "same offense." See
Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1957 n.1, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (Thus, in the context of criminal proceedings, legislatively authorized
multiple punishments are permissible if imposed in a single proceeding, but impermissible if
imposed in successive proceedings.").
44. See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689 ("If a federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing
multiple punishments not authorized by Congress, it violates not only the specific guarantee
against double jeopardy, but also the constitutional principle of separation of powers in a man-
ner that trenches particularly harshly on individual liberty."); Kenneth G. Schuler, Continuing
Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2220,
2225-26 & n.40 (1993) (stating that the multiple punishments rule serves the important interest
in maintaining separation of powers between legislature and judiciary).
45. Peter Westen and Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978
S. Ct. Rev. 81, 108 ("[I]nsofar as a defendant was subjected to punishment in excess of what the
legislature intended, he was 'doubly' punished in violation of the' Double Jeopardy Clause.");
Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 ("Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine
punishments is vested with the legislature, the question of whether punishments are multiple is
essentially one of legislative intent.") (citation omitted).
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single judgment exceeds the legislature's punitive limits, it
undermines its own integrity and finality. The prohibition on
unauthorized punishment therefore can be seen as one aspect of the
central multiple punishments interest.
The Court, however, treated the ban on unauthorized
punishment as an end in itself, rather than a means of vindicating a
broader double jeopardy interest. At times the Court even stated that
the multiple punishments prohibition serves no other purpose
whatsoever. 46 "Legislatures," the Court announced flatly, "not courts,
prescribe the scope of punishments."47  Many commentators have
presumed that this function is the core interest underlying the
prohibition. 48 This perception is not surprising, however, for the
multiple punishments issues rarely arose outside the context of
multiple punishments imposed in a single judgment. Generally,
defendants subjected to punishment (or the threat of punishment) in
two separate judgments could challenge the action under the bar on
retrial after conviction.49 Naturally, observers defined the multiple
punishments interest solely in terms of the context in which it
generally arose: multiple punishments rendered under a single
judgment.
B. The Halper Model: Punishments in Separate Proceedings
1. United States v. Halper and Department of Revenue v.
Kurth Ranch
During the 1980s and early 1990s criminal law enforcement
strategies changed dramatically. In response to public furor over
crime rates, legislatures promulgated-and prosecutors increasingly
relied upon-a vast array of civil and adminstrative sanctions to sup-
46. See Jones, 491 U.S. at 381 ("Our cases establish that in the multiple punishments con-
text, [double jeopardy] is limited to ensuring that the total punishment [does] not exceed that
authorized by the legislature.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Albernaz v. United States,
450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)-'("[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible
is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be
imposed."); Whalen, 445 U.S. at 688-89 (stating that the "dispositive" question is whether the
legislature provided for cumulative punishments).
47. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368.
48. See, for example, George C. Thomas III, A Unified Theory ofMultiple Punishment, 47
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1985).
49. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957 (arguing that before Halper the multiple punish-
ments prohibition did not much matter because the multiple prosecutions prohibition "would
make surplusage of any distinct protection against additional punishment imposed in a succes-
sive prosecution").
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plement traditional criminal punishments.50 Many defendants found
themselves facing imprisonment, fines, civil forfeiture, and civil taxes
for the same criminal conduct.51 And such consequences could be
imposed in any number of criminal, civil, or administrative
proceedings. 52
Against this backdrop, a second model of multiple punish-
ments surfaced in the Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurispru-
dence. In United States v. Halper,53 the Court held that punishments
imposed in "separate proceedings" violated the multiple punishments
prohibition even when the legislature had clearly authorized both
punishments. 54 At trial the court sentenced Halper, who had been
convicted of sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false-claims
statute, to two years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.55  The
Government then brought a civil action against Halper under the
False Claims Act.56 Under the civil statute, Halper's sixty-five
violations could have resulted in fines of $130,000.57 Therefore, in
light of the extreme disparity between the amount of the monetary
sanction and the government's actual damages, 58 the Court held that
civil sanctions could constitute "punishment" for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.59 The Halper Court then held that because
Halper had already been punished in the separate criminal
proceedings, any further punishment (that is, the civil sanctions)
would violate the multiple punishments prohibition. 60
The Court did not fully articulate the reason for its departure
from the traditional legislative deference model. In a footnote the
Court stated that in separate proceedings, the Double Jeopardy
Clause "protects against the possibility that the Government is seek-
ing the second punishment because it is dissatisfied with the sanction
50. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 103 (cited in note 7) (noting the "remarkable increase
in the last decade in the imposition of overlapping civil, administrative and criminal sanctions
for the same misconducC); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 Yale L. J. 1795, 1844-61 (1992) (analyzing the greater role
of civil sanctions in modern law enforcement).
51. King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 103 n.1 (cited in note 7).
52. Id.
53. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
54. Id. at 448-49.
55. Id. at 437.
56. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1994 ed.).
57. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
58. The defendant duped the government out of only $585. Id. at 437.
59. The Court remanded the case to allow the government the opportunity to prove that
the fines were not so disproportionate to the government's actual costs that they would consti-
tute a second punishment. Id. at 452.
60. Id. at 448-49.
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obtained in the first proceeding."61 The Court insisted that in a single
proceeding, the multiple punishments inquiry would still be limited to
ensuring that punishment did not exceed legislative limits.62
The Court's focus on the proceedings, rather than the
punishment itself, suggested a concern for avoiding the dangers and
burdens associated with a second criminal prosecution akin to the
interest behind the multiple prosecutions prohibition. But the Halper
Court seemed to reject any reliance on a procedural finality interest.
When determining the punitive nature of the civil sanction, it
specifically refused to analyze whether Halper's further civil
proceeding was functionally similar to a criminal prosecution.63
Instead, the Court looked only to the nature of the punishment
itself.64 In addition, the Court specifically rejected the government's
argument that in determining whether a civil sanction is punitive,
one should employ a highly deferential statutory analysis standard
previously used to determine what safeguards must accompany
certain kinds of proceedings. 65 Instead, the Court held that because
the multiple punishments prohibition is "intrinsically personal" and
serves "humane interests," one must focus exclusively on the nature of
the sanction rather than "proceedings as a general matter."'6 The
Halper Court thus appeared uncertain whether it was truly relying on
the multiple punishments prohibition or on a procedural finality
interest already protected by the bar on multiple prosecutions.6 7
In Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,68 the Court further
obscured the nature of the interest underlying its most recent strand
61. Id. at 451 n.10.
62. Id. at 450 ("Nor does [our] decision prevent the Government from seeking and obtain-
ing both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in
the same proceeding. In a single proceeding the multiple-punishment issue would be limited to
ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature.").
63. The Court stated:
[W]hile recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is appropriate in identify-
ing the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in determining the constitutional safeguards
that must accompany those proceedings as a general matter, the approach is not well
suited to the context of the "humane interests" safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause's proscription of multiple punishments. This constitutional protection is intrinsi-
cally personal. Its violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the ac-
tual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state.
Id. at 447.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Elizabeth S. Jahncke, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines, and the
Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 112, 137 n.202 (1991) (stating
that the Court's focus on separate proceedings contradicted its multiple punishments charac-
terization of the case).
68. 114 S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994).
MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
of multiple punishment jurisprudence. After holding that a
legislatively authorized 69 civil tax on drug possession constituted
punishment,70 the Kurth Ranch Court struck down the tax under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.71 Noting that the tax was sought in a
separate proceeding72 after the defendants had been prosecuted and
punished on drug charges,73 the Court held that the tax had to be
imposed "in the first prosecution or not at all."74 The Court once again
invoked the "intrinsically personal" interest underlying the multiple
punishment prohibition and stated that the analysis must focus
exclusively on the nature of the sanction.75 Yet this time, the Court
concluded that the administrative proceeding in which the
Government attempted to assess the tax was "the functional
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution that placed the
[defendants] in jeopardy a second time 'for the same offence.' "76
The Kurth Ranch Court thus implied, even more strongly than
did the Halper Court, that the multiple punishments prohibition
serves to protect defendants' procedural finality interest in avoiding
the burdens of a second criminal prosecution. Because the Court
deemed the administrative proceeding the "functional equivalent" of a
second criminal prosecution, it implied that any civil or
administrative proceeding that imposes punishment entails the same
burdens and dangers as a criminal proceeding.77 Yet the Kurth Ranch
Court grounded its holding in the multiple punishments prohibition
rather than the prohibition against multiple prosecutions which had
always protected against such dangers. Having thus blurred the
distinction between multiple punishments and multiple prosecutions,
69. See id. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('IT]he Montana legislature authorized these
taxes in addition to the criminal penalties for possession of marijuana ....").
70. The Court cited several "unusual features" that rendered the tax punitive. It noted
that the "so-called tax" was conditioned on the commission of a crime, that it was exacted after
the taxpayer had been arrested for the conduct giving rise to the tax, and was levied on goods
that the taxpayer neither owned nor possessed when the tax is imposed. Id. at 1947-48.
71. Id.
72. The court sentenced four of the defendants to suspended or deferred sentences. Id. at
1942.
73. The tax was assessed in an administrative proceeding and the defendants challenged
it in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 1943.
74. See Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 137 n.202 (cited in note 67) (stating that the Court's
focus on separate proceedings contradicted its multiple punishments characterization of the
case).
75. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
76. Id. at 1948.
77. See id. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The only conceivable foundation for [the
Court's conclusion] is the implicit assumption that any proceeding which imposes 'punishment'
within the meaning of the multiple-punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is a
criminal prosecution.").
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the Court left to the lower courts the task of applying the newfound
multiple punishments rule.
2. The Halper Model in the Lower Courts
Not surprisingly, the Court's uncertainty in Halper and Kurth
Ranch has caused much confusion among lower courts attempting to
apply the separate proceedings model of multiple punishments. Many
courts have analyzed cases involving separate proceedings the same
way they would a multiple prosecutions claim.78 Importing multiple
prosecutions analysis into multiple punishments cases, however,
leads to procedural difficulties. Some of the most troubling problems
have occurred when the government seeks punitive civil and criminal
sanctions in simultaneous but separate proceedings. In such cases,
although one proceeding might begin first, the other proceeding might
culminate in a judgment of punishment first. Courts then have to
determine which punishment is the constitutionally barred "second
jeopardy."79 Most courts faced with this problem have analogized to
the concept of jeopardy "attachment" from multiple prosecutions cases
to conclude that the first jeopardy occurred in whichever proceeding
jeopardy first attached.80 Many have thus concluded that jeopardy
attaches in criminal proceedings for purposes of the multiple
punishment prohibition when evidence is first presented to the trier
of fact rather than when punishment is imposed.8' Some courts
applying the prohibition have even extended this early attachment
78. See, for example, United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1215-16
(9th Cir. 1994) (analyzing a civil forfeiture proceeding following a criminal prosecution under
double jeopardy's protection against "successive prosecutions-that is, against efforts to impose
punishment for the same offense in two or more separate proceedings").
79. See United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir. 1994) ('You can't have double
jeopardy without a former jeopardy.").
80. See, for example, Dawson v. United States, 77 F.3d 180, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Gehring, 87 F.3d 1323, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (unreported case); United States v. Pierce,
60 F.3d 886, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Aguilar, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4220 (N.D.
Ill. 1995); United States v. Whitley, 896 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Wis. 1995); United States v.
Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791 (D. Or. 1994); United States v. Groceinan, 882 F. Supp. 976 (E.D.
Wash. 1995); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Torres, 28 F.3d at
1465.
81. See, for example, United States v. Linn, 87 F.3d 1324, 1324 (9th Cir. 1996) (unreported
case) (concluding that criminal conviction did not violate the multiple punishments prohibition
when the jury was empaneled four days before defendant filed answer in civil forfeiture proceed-
ing); United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560, 568 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that jeopardy attached
first in a criminal prosecution when the jury was empaneled and sworn, even though defendant
was criminally sentenced after imposition of civil forfeiture); Williams v. United States, 1996
WL 117011 at 3 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that jeopardy attached when jury was empaneled and
sworn in criminal proceeding before it attached in civil proceeding).
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rule to civil proceedings. 82 The early attachment rule, however,
focuses on proceedings rather than punishments. It is premised on
the defendant's interest in not having to risk the further stigma and
psychological pressure of a second criminal proceeding.8 3 These
dangers are entirely irrelevant to the issue of whether or not a
defendant has been punished twice. In fact, the ironic result of
importing this attachment rule to the multiple punishments context is
that jeopardy attaches in a proceeding before one even knows whether
the proceeding will result in punishment at all.
Courts have also attempted to apply the multiple prosecutions
rule of compulsory joinder in Halper-type cases. But while requiring
joinder of all prosecutions based on the same criminal offense has not
produced much procedural difficulty, 84 a corresponding joinder rule for
civil and criminal proceedings presents extremely difficult procedural
obstacles. These include differing burdens of proof, discovery rules,
and constitutional safeguards8s Many believe, in fact, that such
joinder is impossible.86 Furthermore, even if such joinder were
feasible, such rules could force Government attorneys to choose only
one of two or more possible punitive routes for any given offense.87
Courts reluctant to impose such a draconian rule on prosecutors have
82. See, for example, United States v. Idowu, 74 F.3d 387, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that jeopardy attaches in a criminal trial when the defendant "is placed at risk of being pun-
ished"); United States v. Levine, 905 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (declaring that
"[j]eopardy 'attaches' in a civil forfeiture proceeding at the beginning of the hearing, when
evidence is first presented to the trier of face'). But see United States v. Tamez, 881 F. Supp.
460, 466 (E.D. Wash. 1995) (holding that jeopardy did not attach in civil forfeiture action until
court entered forfeiture decree); United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 800 (D. Or. 1994)
(same).
83. In Bretz, the Court explained that the rule
reflects and protects the defendant's interest in retaining a chosen jury. We cannot hold
that this rule, so grounded, is only at the periphery of double jeopardy concerns. Those
concerns-the finality of judgments, the minimization of harassing exposure to the har-
rowing experience of a criminal trial, and the valued right to continue with the chosen
jury-have combined to produce the federal law that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches
when the jury is empaneled and sworn.
437 U.S. at 38.
84. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow joinder of a broader range of offenses
than those that would constitute the "same offense" under the Blockburger test. See generally
FRCrP 8 and 14.
85. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 142 n.123 (cited in note 7) (noting the inability of
government attorneys to bring civil, administrative, and criminal penalties in the same proceed-
ing); Henning, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 55 (cited in note 7) (criticizing the Court for ignoring the
fact that the government cannot bring civil and criminal actions together); Linda S. Eads,
Separating crime from Punishment: The Constitutional Implication of United States v. Halper,
68 Wash. U. L. Q. 929, 978-83 (1990) (discussing the inability to join civil and criminal actions).
86. See generally sources cited in note 85.
87. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 145 (cited in note 7) ("By barring later efforts to punish
defendants with penalties that cannot be joined with penalties obtained in earlier prosecutions,
the Court has forced government attorneys to choose only one penalty.").
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endorsed ad hoc totality of the circumstances analyses to find that
overlapping civil and criminal proceedings actually constitute a
"single, coordinated prosecution. ' 8
3. United States v. Ursery and the Decline of the Halper Model
This past term the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
United States v. Ursery,89 a separate proceedings double jeopardy
case. Thus, it had an opportunity to alleviate the confusion in the
lower courts over application of the multiple punishments prohibition.
Rather than clarifying Halper and Kurth Ranch, however, the Court
avoided applying those cases at all by holding that a civil forfeiture
statute simply did not constitute punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause90 Only three years earlier, however, in
Austin v. United States,9 1 the Court held that the same civil forfeiture
statute did constitute punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines
Clause.92 Thus, the Ursery holding seems rather suspect.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion offered little to justify the
conclusion that "punishment" means different things in different
constitutional clauses. He stated that in the excessive fines context,
Austin requires courts to make a threshold determination of whether
a forfeiture constitutes punishment and then make a second determi-
nation of whether that punishment is excessive.9 3 However, under
Justice Rehnquist's reading of Halper, the same sanction would only
constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause if
88. See, for example, United States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86, 89 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that
a civil forfeiture action and a criminal prosecution can constitute a "single, coordinated prose-
cution" if they are initiated at nearly the same time and if they are connected in an obvious
way); United States v. Smith, 75 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that civil and criminal
action could constitute the "same procedural entity" if government pursued remedies concur-
rently); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that civil forfeiture
action and criminal action were a single proceeding for purposes of the Halper analysis); United
States v. One Single Family Residence, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
"simultaneous pursuie' of criminal and civil sanctions rendered government action a "single,
coordinated prosecution"); United States v. Cartagena, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17011 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (seeking civil and criminal sanctions in same indictment constituted "single proceeding"
despite separate administrative and judicial execution of the sanctions). But see United States
v. One Parcel of Real Property with Buildings, Appurtenances, and Improvements, 908 F. Supp.
1070, 1083 (D. R.I. 1995) (finding no single coordinated prosecution where civil and criminal
actions were tried at different times, by different fact finders and would end twenty-two months
apart).
89. 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996).
90. Id. Ursery actually decided two cases which were consolidated by the Court.
91. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
92. Id. at 621-22.
93. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146.
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a court determined it was excessive in the first place.94 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, the threshold level of punitiveness needed to render a
sanction "punishment" for the Eighth Amendment is lower than that
needed for the Fifth.95 A brief reading of Halper and Austin makes
Justice Rehnquist's formalistic reasoning appear disingenuous. The
Austin Court recognized no distinction between the meaning of
"punishment" in different constitutional clauses-indeed, the Court
explicitly applied Halper's double jeopardy definition of punishment to
conclude that civil forfeitures constitute punishment in the excessive
fines context.96
Thus, instead of clarifying Halper, the Ursery decision further
confused the Court's jurisprudence. 97 Not even sure whether to
address multiple prosecutions or multiple punishments, the Court
tried to cover all its bases by declaring that the civil forfeiture at issue
was neither "criminal" nor "punishment."98 This Note suggests that
the Ursery decision most likely represents an effort to restrict the
Halper and Kurth Ranch model of multiple punishments. In other
words, instead of disentangling Halper and Kurth Ranch's focus on
proceedings from the traditional multiple punishments analysis, the
Court ducked the issue.99
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2147.
96. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
97. The explicit holdings of Halper, Austin and Ursery can be stacked together to produce
a baldly fallacious logical syllogism.
[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is pun-
ishment, as we have come to understand the term. We therefore hold that under the
Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (internal citation omitted). "[W]e cannot conclude that forfeiture
under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) serves solely a remedial purpose. We therefore conclude that
forfeiture under these provisions constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense ....' Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448). 'These [§ 881(a)(7)] civil
forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally), we hold, do not constitute 'punishment' for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause.'" Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2138 (not citing Halper or Austin).
A thorough analysis of the constitutional definition of "punishment" is beyond the scope of
this Note. The criticism of the Court's inconsistency in the area is raised only to illustrate the
shaky doctrinal ground on which the Court's multiple punishment jurisprudence rests.
98. Ursery, 116 U.S. at 2149.
99. Writing before Ursery, Professor King remarked on this strategy emerging in the
opinions of the individual justices in Kurth Ranch. Professor King first criticized Justice
O'Connor's unfaithful reading of the Halper definition of punishment. She then went on to
acknowledge that "it is more expedient to avoid the consequences of [the Halper] rule by
refusing to find that a penalty constitutes punishment that to challenge the rule directly." King,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 175 (cited in note 7).
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Clearly, the Ursery Court's evasion of the multiple punish-
ments issue did nothing to remedy the Court's ailing multiple pun-
ishments jurisprudence. Indeed, by holding that civil forfeiture does
not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the Ursery Court probably eliminated most cases in which it
would have to address Halper claims.100 The problem of Halper and
Kurth Ranch was not their holding that certain civil sanctions
constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. Rather, the
weakness of the decisions lies in their failure to articulate clearly that
the focus of analysis in the multiple punishments context should be
punishments, not proceedings. The Court could clear up a lot of the
confusion by focusing on the basic question of what the multiple
punishments prohibition actually protects and identifying a main
interest or principle that guides it.
IV. THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS PROHIBITION AND THE INTEGRITY OF
FINAL JUDGMENTS
A. Redefining Multiple Punishments Rules in Terms of the
Interest They Protect
Much ink has been spilled criticizing the weaknesses of the
Supreme Court's multiple punishment jurisprudence. Many commen-
tators have faulted the Halper Court for interfering with the legisla-
ture's power to punish. 10 Others claim that the Court's focus on mul-
tiple punishments is really a clumsy attempt to vindicate interests
more properly protected under the Eighth Amendment.102 Still others
charge the Court with protecting procedural finality interests when
none exist in the civil arena. 13
100. By holding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Ursery Court probably cut away the bulk of the cases in which
Halper claims could protect defendants. Civil forfeiture has been described as the government's
"tactical nuclear weapon" in the war on crime. Michael de Courcy Hinds, States Seek Tougher
Drug Forfeit Laws, N.Y. Times, at All (July 16, 1990) (quoting Richard M. Wintory, Director of
the National Drug Prosecution Center).
101. For sources discussing the impossibility of joining civil and criminal proceedings, see
notes 85 and accompanying text.
102. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 145 (cited in note 7) ("A mandate to use only one of
several authorized penalties is a poor way to prevent punishment from exceeding a constitu-
tional ceiling on severity.").
103. See Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 136 (cited in note 67) ("The interest in finality of a
criminal prosecution, protected by the prohibition against successive prosecutions, simply was
not present in Halper.").
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These problems have arisen because the Court has only
defined the multiple punishments prohibition in terms of its function
in different contexts. Viewed separately, each model of multiple
punishments fails to justify reading a prohibition into the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The legislative deference model strains the language of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A prohibition on punishment exceeding
legislatively authorized limits for its own sake would seem more at
home in the Due Process Clause than in the landscape of double
jeopardy doctrine.104 The Due Process Clause-with its general
requirement that all punishment be in accord with the law of the
land 05 and its corollary rule of strictly construing statutes in favor of
lenity-parallels closely the multiple punishments prohibition's
requirement of legislative authorization and presumption against
cumulation.106
The Halper and Kurth Ranch model blurs the distinction
between the multiple punishment prohibition and the bar on multiple
prosecutions. By focusing the multiple punishments inquiry on
separate proceedings, and characterizing a civil tax proceeding as the
"functional equivalent" of a second prosecution, 0 7 Halper and Kurth
Ranch suggest a finality interest in avoiding the dangers of du-
plicative proceedings. Civil proceedings, however, do not create the
kind of procedural burdens associated with more oppressive criminal
prosecutions. 0 8 Furthermore, if a civil proceeding culminating in
punishment were indeed the "functional equivalent" of a prosecution,
one would suppose that the Constitution's other procedural
safeguards (for example, the right to counsel and the right against
self-incrimination) would attach to those proceedings as well.0 9 Yet
they clearly do not. The Court's apparent concern with "separate
proceedings" thus seems misplaced.
104. Justice Scalia uses this criticism to advocate scrapping the multiple punishments
prohibition entirely. In Justice Scalia's opinion the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit
multiple punishments at all. "Instead, the Due Process Clause keeps punishment within the
bounds established by the legislature .. " Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1958.
105. Id. at 1959.
106. The relationship between the due process rule of strict construction and double
jeopardy's presumption against cumulation is firmly established. See Comment, 75 Yale L. J. at
311-21 (cited in note 18) (comparing double jeopardy limits on multiple punishments with
similar due process rules of construction).
107. See Part III.B.1.
108. See Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 135-38 (cited in note 67) (arguing that the Halper
Court identified a procedural finality interest where none existed in the civil arena).
109. See generally Eads, 68 Wash. U. L. Q. at 929 (cited in note 85) (warning that the
Halper rationale could lead to an improper mandatory application of the Eighth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments to government-initiated civil penalty cases).
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Thus the two freestanding models of the multiple punishment
prohibition appear unrelated to each other and only vagulely
connected with the clause they are supposed to inhabit. This Note
argues that the Court should identify the interest that guides the
various applications of the right. Rather than defining the prohibition
in terms of its requirements, the Court should define its requirements
in terms of the interest they serve. What then is the interest that
underlies the multiple punishments prohibition?
Some claim that the prohibition serves the sole purpose of
ensuring that punishment does not exceed that authorized by the
legislature."0 These criticisms of the Halper decision are premised on
the notion that the sole interest underlying the multiple punishments
prohibition is ensuring legislative authorization for all punishment.
But even putting aside Halper and Kurth Ranch, precedent reveals
that the multiple punishments prohibition's original purpose was not
so narrowly restricted.
Almost a century after Lange, and twenty years before Halper,
the Court in North Carolina v. Pearce"' struck down a punishment
under the multiple punishments prohibition despite the fact that the
sentence was within the legislatively authorized maximum."2 In one
of the lesser known companion cases decided with Pearce, a defendant
by the name of Rice had been convicted of certain crimes in an
Alabama trial court and sentenced to ten years imprisonment."3
After serving two and one half years of his sentence, Rice had the
judgments set aside on the ground that he was denied his constitu-
tional right to counsel." 4 The case was retried in state court and the
defendant was again convicted."m This time, however, the trial judge
sentenced Rice to twenty-five years in prison." 6 The judge refused to
credit the time Rice had already spent in prison toward the second
sentence. 117 On appeal, Rice argued that the court's refusal to credit
the time served to the new sentence violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The new sentence, however, even if combined with the years
already spent in prison, was within the statutory maximum of thirty
110. See Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 117 (cited in note 67).
111. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
112. Id. at 726. Justice Scalia's contention, therefore, that "until Halper, the Court never
invalidated a legislatively authorized successive punishment," Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1956,
is in error.
113. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 714.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
186 [Vol. 50:167
MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS
years.'1 8 Thus, if the multiple punishments prohibition's only purpose
is ensuring that punishment does not exceed legislative limits, the
twenty-seven-year sentence should have passed constitutional
muster.
Yet the Supreme Court agreed with Rice. The Court first
noted that the multiple punishments violation would indeed be dra-
matically evident in a case where the sum of uncredited time served
and the sentence upon reconviction exceeded the legislatively author-
ized maximum., The Court, however, went on to hold that the mul-
tiple punishments prohibition still applies "whenever punishment
already endured is not fully subtracted from any new sentence im-
posed."120 According to the Pearce Court, all punishments exacted
pursuant to a first conviction must be fully "credited" toward any new
punishment imposed upon reconviction after appeal.121
Clearly, then, the legislative deference model of the multiple
punishment prohibition cannot justify the result in Pearce. Yet nei-
ther can the decision be explained by any procedural finality interest
implied by the Court in Halper and Kurth Ranch. If the multiple
punishment prohibition protects against the burdens of a subsequent
proceeding, then Rice could not lawfully have been resentenced in the
second trial. 22 The Pearce decision, however, is consistent with the
Double Jeopardy Clause's purpose of preserving the integrity of final
judgments. The multiple punishments violation occurred because the
uncredited time served exceeded the limits of the final valid judgment
of twenty-five years. By failing to account for the two and one half
year imprisonment, the trial court effectively sentenced Rice to
118. Id. at 719 n.14. Rice was convicted on three counts of second-degree burglary, each
count carrying a maximum sentence of ten years. Id.
119. Id. at 718. The Court elaborated:
The constitutional violation is flagrantly apparent in a case involving the imposition of a
maximum sentence after reconviction. Suppose, for example, in a jurisdiction where the
maximum allowable sentence for larceny is 10 years' imprisonment, a man succeeds in
getting his larceny conviction set aside after serving three years in prison. If, upon
reconviction, he is given a 10oyear sentence, then, quite clearly, he will have received
multiple punishments for the same offense. For he will have been compelled to serve
separate prison terms of three years and 10 years, although the maximum single pun-
ishment for the offense is 10 years' imprisonment.
Id.
120. Id. The Court stated that the same rule would apply to a defendant who had paid a
fine upon the first conviction: "Any new fine imposed upon reconviction would have to be
decreased by the amount previously paid." Id. at 718 n.12.
121. Id. at 718-19.
122. See DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 135 (discussing Pearce and noting that "if any rule of
finality had applied to the pronouncement of a sentence, the original sentence would have
served as a ceiling on the one imposed at retrial").
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twenty-seven and one-half years' imprisonment when its own final
judgment only authorized a sentence of twenty-five years.
Pearce demonstrates the importance of understanding multiple
punishment rules in terms of the broader interest they serve. One
could, of course, read the Pearce rule narrowly in terms of the specific
context in which it operates. Stated in those terms, Pearce requires
punishment imposed under a previous conviction to be fully credited
to any new sentence imposed after appeal. This reading of the deci-
sion, however, would simply add another freestanding rule to the
Court's already cloudy multiple punishments jurisprudence. If Pearce
is understood in terms of double jeopardy's original purpose of pre-
serving the integrity of final judgments, the decision would prohibit
any punishment not accounted for by the first final judgment.123 If a
punishment is not accounted for, then that punishment exceeds the
limits on punishment set by the sentencing authority and undermines
the integrity of the final judgment.2 4
This interpretation of the interest behind the multiple
punishments prohibition is borne out by the case which gave birth to
the protection-Lange. Although the Court in Lange did not
articulate the interest underlying the newly identified prohibition on
multiple punishments, its result seems entirely consistent with the
interest in preserving the integrity of final judgments. The defendant
in Lange had served one of two maximum alternative penalties when
he paid the $200 fine. Insofar as the fine constituted an authorized
punishment for his offense, the defendant had endured a single
punishment under a final judgment. Of course, the original sentence
of fine and imprisonment was erroneously severe, but that error did
not nullify the valid portion of the judgment that the defendant had
123. Justice Stevens noted this aspect of the multiple punishment prohibition in Ursery.
After reaching issues not reached by the majority, he stated that a punitive civil forfeiture must
be joined with a criminal prosecution at the sentencing stage, for "a single judgment encompass-
ing the entire punishment for the defendant's offense is precisely what the Double Jeopardy
Clause requires." 116 S. Ct. at 2163 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens cited no
authority for this proposition and did not explain his reasons for making it, his insight essen-
tially corresponds to the thesis of this Note.
124. Some commentators have hinted at/suggested such a rule as an aspect of the multiple
punishment prohibition. See, for example, Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing
the Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 Yale L. J. 632, 636 (1981)
(noting that one of the multiple punishment prohibition's limitations requires the sentencing
court to "take full account of all separate punishments imposed for a single offense"); Westen
and Drubel, 1978 S. Ct. Rev. at 109 (cited in note 45) (noting that "the protection against double
punishment is not limited to penalties in excess of legislative authority but also extends to
'excessive' penalties as defined by the body possessing final sentencing authority under the
domestic law").
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satisfied.'2 5 By paying the fine the defendant rendered the judgment
of punishment (to the extent it imposed the maximum authorized
fine) final and valid., 6 Any further punishment under a second
judgment would undermine the integrity of the first. First, as a
matter of pure statutory interpretation, it would constitute a second
punishment when the legislature had authorized only one. Second, it
would arbitrarily subject the defendant to punishment in excess of the
court's first final judgment. If the legitimacy or integrity of
judgments is defined by the punitive limits set by the legislature and
the judiciary, either of these flaws would undermine the integrity of
the first judgment.
Consider how this reading of Pearce and Lange applies to the
seemingly inconsistent models prevailing in the modern Court's
multiple punishments jurisprudence.
The results in Halper and Kurth Ranch follow quite naturally
from the broader rule of Pearce. In those cases, the punishments
imposed in the civil proceedings were not accounted for in the final
judgments imposed in the prior criminal prosecutions.' 27 Halper and
Kurth Ranch struck down the legislatively authorized civil punish-
ments not because the separate civil proceeding implicated finality
interests, but because the civil "punishments" would have
undermined the integrity of the valid criminal judgment.
The legislative deference model of multiple punishments dem-
onstrates that punishment not accounted for by the legislature un-
dermines the integrity of judgments as surely as punishment not
accounted for by the sentencing authority.' 28 If a judge imposes pun-
ishment in excess of legislatively authorized limits, she punishes as if
the defendant had been convicted more than once for the same of-
fense. To the extent that a court imposes punishment in excess of its
125. In response to the Government's argument that the first judgment must be treated as
"no judgment" the Court stated that "[t]he error of the Court in imposing the two punishments
mentioned in the statute, when it had only the alternative of one of them, did not make the
judgment wholly void." Lange, 85 U.S. at 174.
126. The Court noted that "if no part of the sentence had been executed, [the court] could
have rendered a judgment for two hundred dollars fine after vacating the first." Id.
127. The primary difference between the Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions and the Pearce
decision is that in the former, the government attorneys, rather than the trial judge, induced
the multiple punishment violation when they sought punishment in excess of the final judg-
ment.
128. This, perhaps, is what the Pearce Court meant when it stated that a multiple punish-
ments violation would be more "flagrantly apparent" in a case where the sum of uncredited time
served and punishment imposed upon reconviction exceeded the legislative maximum. See note
119.
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authority, its judgment cannot be considered valid in the first place. 129
Such punishment, therefore, exceeds the scope of the final valid
judgment and violates the multiple punishment prohibition.
By thus defining its various applications of the multiple pun-
ishments prohibition in terms of the double jeopardy interest the
prohibition serves, the Court could do much to rid its jurisprudence of
apparent anomalies and inconsistencies. Instead, the Court has
emphasized proceedings and legislative maximums as if each had
some independent double jeopardy significance. The Court should
place the multiple punishment focus where it belongs: on final
judgments of punishment.
B. Applying the Multiple Punishments Prohibition
Explicitly acknowledging the interest in preserving the integ-
rity of final judgments would resolve many of the vexing issues lower
courts have had to deal with in the wake of Halper and Kurth Ranch.
One problem facing the lower courts in the context of overlapping
proceedings has been determining which punishment constitutes the
second prohibited jeopardy. As discussed above, 130 courts have awk-
wardly analogized to the multiple prosecutions concept of
"attachment" to solve this dilemma. But attachment of double jeop-
ardy prohibitions at the outset of the trial protects an interest in
limiting the dangers associated with criminal prosecu-
tions'31-dangers which are not implicated in the multiple punish-
ments context. 132 The multiple prosecutions concept of jeopardy at-
tachment thus provides an awkward fit in the multiple punishments
context.
Focusing on the first final and valid judgment of punishment
provides a more appropriate method of determining which
punishment constitutes the prohibited jeopardy. Jeopardy in the
multiple punishments context attaches when a final judgment of pun-
ishment is imposed, for it is only at that point that the defendant has
129. The multiple punishments rule, therefore, requires such a sentence to be reduced until
all separate punishments imposed in the judgment render it a single, valid judgment. An illus-
tration of this remedy is provided by the Court's decision in Jones. The trial court sentenced the
defendant to two consecutive sentences: one for felony murder and one for the underlying
felony of attempted robbery, with the shorter of the two sentences to run first. Jones, 491 U.S.
at 378. The legislature had not intended to allow cumulative punishments. Id. After the
defendant had finished serving the shorter sentence, the trial court vacated that sentence and
credited the time served to the longer sentence for felony murder. Id. at 379.
130. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
131. See note 83 and accompanying text.
132. Id.
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an interest in preserving the integrity of the final judgment.133 The
second jeopardy would therefore be any punishment, civil or criminal,
that is not accounted for in first final and valid judgment of punish-
ment. 13
4
Many courts have also had to decide when overlapping pro-
ceedings are "separate" for purposes of the multiple punishments
prohibition such that they produce separate (multiple)
punishments. 35 In light of the procedural difficulties of joining civil
and criminal proceedings, courts have devised de facto joinder rules
based on the simultaneous or coordinated prosecutorial pursuit of the
criminal and civil sanctions.1 36  But courts need not, strain the
meaning of "separate proceedings" to allow prosecutors to impose both
civil and criminal sanctions. Since the multiple punishment
prohibition is not concerned with any procedural finality interest,
there is no reason criminal and punitive civil proceedings must be
joined for trial purposes. The multiple punishments prohibition is
only implicated when all punishments are not accounted for in the
final judgment of punishment. The single judgment rule would only
require joinder at the sentencing stage so that all punishments can be
accounted for in the final valid judgment. 37 Prosecutors could thus
pursue separate civil and criminal proceedings up until the
sentencing stage without facing any of the joinder obstacles posed by
133. Several Supreme Court holdings are consistent with the proposition that only a final
judgment of punishment will limit a defendant's exposure to additional punishment. The Court
has held, for example, that an erroneous sentence that falls below the statutory minimum can
later be increased without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Bozza v. United States,
330 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1947) (noting that the trial court "only set aside what it had no authority
to do and substitute[d] directions required by the law to be done upon the conviction of the
offender" (quoting In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 260 (1894)). Similarly, the Court has held that, at
least in some circumstance, the Government may timely appeal a trial court's sentence.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 143. Such holdings reflect the notion that punishment by itself cannot
trigger any finality interest. Rather, the multiple punishments prohibition is only concerned
with preserving integrity of a judgment that is already final.
134. A comparison of Pearce and Halper is illustrative of this point. In Pearce the Court
prohibited the first two and one-half year sentence by requiring it to count toward the satisfac-
tion of the second twenty-five year sentence. This is because the second punishment constituted
the first final judgment of punishment (since the first sentence was reversed on appeal). The
uncredited time served under the first nonfinal judgment thus undermined the integrity of the
first final judgment of punishment. In Halper, on the other hand, the first final judgment of
punishment occurred in the criminal trial. Preserving the integrity of that first final judgment
thus required the prohibition of the later civil punishment. The prohibited punishment, there-
fore, may occur first or second depending on when the first final judgment occurs.
135. See note 79 and accompanying text.
136. See notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
137. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Ursery, recognized this point. 116 S. Ct. at 2163
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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disparate burdens of proof, discovery rules, and procedural
safeguards.135
C. The Multiple Punishments Prohibition and Arbitrary Punishment
This Note has attempted to show that, notwithstanding the
Court's unclear and apparently inconsistent jurisprudence, the multi-
ple punishment prohibition has a solid doctrinal basis in the Double
Jeopardy Clause's original purpose of preserving the integrity of final
judgments. Nevertheless, some argue that the Double Jeopardy
Clause is ill-suited to serve as a limit on punishment. Other
constitutional rights, they claim, are better designed to avoid
arbitrary or excessive punishments. Accordingly, this last section
explains how preserving the integrity of final judgments protects
defendants from arbitrary punishments arising peculiarly from
multiplicity in modern law enforcement strategies. 139
Protection against arbitrary and excessive punishments is a
function traditionally associated with the Eighth Amendment.40 The
Eighth Amendment, however, does not adequately protect defendants
when legislatures may divide punitive sanctions among different
offenses and proceedings.'14 Punishments that are not dis-
proportionate individually can become disproportionate when cumu-
lated.142 Requiring trial judges to take account of all punishments in
138. In response to an Ursery prosecutor's argument that civil and criminal sanctions
"cannot be (and never have been) joined together in a single trial" Justice Stevens explained:
I cannot agree with the Government's view that there is any procedural obstacle to in-
cluding a punitive forfeiture in the final judgment entered in a criminal case. The sen-
tencing proceeding does not commence until after the defendant has been found guilty,
and I do not see why that proceeding should not encompass all of the punitive sanctions
that are warranted by the conviction.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even if Justice Stevens were wrong in this regard, legislatures
could easily overcome the problem by passing a law that removes the procedural obstacle. See
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 n.6 (1938) (stating that the Constitution presents no
barrier to bringing a civil sanction in a criminal prosecution). When the proceedings end at
different times this requirement may necessitate a stay of judgment in either the civil or the
criminal proceeding pending the liability outcome of the other.
139. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Due
Process Clause ensures that punishment is authorized by the legislature and that the Eighth
Amendment restricts excessive punishment).
140. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual punish-
ments." U.S. Const., Amend. VIII.
141. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 150 (cited in note 7) (noting that "j]udges ... are used
to evaluating the proportionality of penalties one at a time," and stating that double jeopardy
law has "held cumulative penalties somewhat in check").
142. Id. at 151 (stating that "proportionate penalties can add up to disproportionate pun-
ishment").
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one final judgment ensures that they have considered the cumulative
effect of all punishments, and that appellate courts can evaluate the
excessiveness of the full punishment for the offense if the cumulative
punishment is appealed. 43
Furthermore, the multiple punishments prohibition is a
necessary supplement to the multiple prosecutions prohibition. As a
limit on prosecutors, the multiple punishments prohibition is more
significant today than when the Supreme Court decided Pearce in
1969. When prosecutors had only criminal punishments at their
disposal, the bar on retrial after a conviction generally ensured that a
single judgment would account for all of a defendant's punishments
for a given offense.'4 Today's legislatures, however, rely more than
ever upon nontraditional, non-criminal penalties to combat crime. 45
Prosecutors today, therefore, have at their disposal a vast range of
potentially punitive options, including various types of civil monetary
sanctions, taxes on illegal activity, civil forfeitures of all types, regis-
tration of sex offenders, treble damages for antitrust violations, and
punitive damages shared with the state.146  Because of the various
civil and administrative procedural settings in which these sanctions
are sought, defendants cannot rely on the right against retrial after a
conviction to ensure that their punishments are all accounted for in a
single judgment. Thus, the multiple punishments prohibition steps in
to guard against excessive punishments imposed in separate
proceedings.
143. Professor King offers an alternative solution to the problem of multiple punishments
and proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment. She argues that the Eighth
Amendment review should be broadened to consider the proportionality of all separate punish-
ments for a given course of conduct whether such punishments are fines or imprisonment, civil
or criminal, in separate or single proceedings, etc. Under Professor King's approach the Eighth
Amendment would displace double jeopardy for review of punishments resulting from multiple
punishments and multiple prosecutions. The Double Jeopardy Clause would place no limits on
multiple punishments or even multiple prosecutions other than those prescribed by the legisla-
ture. See generally id. at 101.
144. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[U]ntil Halper was de-
cided ... the Double Jeopardy Clause's ban on successive criminal prosecutions would make
surplusage of any distinct protection against additional punishment imposed in a successive
prosecution, since the prosecution itself would be barred.").
145. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to
Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 Hastings L. J. 1325 (1991) (discussing the use of civil remedies to combat crimi-
nal behavior); Mann, 101 Yale L. J. at 1998 (cited in note 50) (noting that punitive civil sanc-
tions have largely replaced criminal law in such areas as white collar crime and drug prosecu-
tions).
146. See King, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 158-60 (cited in note 7). Professor King's article con-
tains a partial list (spanning three pages) of the civil sanctions that could constitute punishment
for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.
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Punishment for the same offense1 7 becomes increasingly
arbitrary when it results from the separate judgments of different
tribunals. For example, two sentencers acting independently will
probably impose greater cumulative punishment than if a single
tribunal had punished under both statutes because each tribunal may
never know the full extent of the defendant's punishment148 Recent
empirical studies tend to support this intuitive conclusion.149
Arbitrariness may also occur when different tribunals impose punish-
ments for the "same offense" that are vastly disparate in severity. At
least one state supreme court recognized an analogous problem when
related but separately tried offenses are not joined at the sentencing
stage.1 50 If criminal offenses that are related can give rise to concerns
of arbitrariness, then the danger of disparate and arbitrary
punishments seems even greater when the offenses are the "same
offense" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 51
By requiring joinder at the sentencing stage when prosecutors
seek both criminal and punitive civil sanctions, the multiple punish-
ments prohibition thus prevents prosecutors from subjecting the de-
fendant to the varying discretion of different punishing tribunals.
The Halper Court gave a quick nod to this function when it stated
that the multiple punishments prohibition prevents prosecutors from
seeking punishment in a second proceeding because they are dissatis-
fied with the one obtained in the first. 152 The multiple punishments
joinder rule thus functions as a limited analogue to the broader rule of
147. See discussion of Blockburger in note 20.
148. Commentators have noted that when related offenses are punished together, sentenc-
ing judges are likely to impose more lenient cumulative punishment than would result if those
offenses were punished separately. See Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy,
49 Vand. L. Rev. 1181, 1192 (1996) (noting the likelihood that defendants will get a lower
cumulative sentence for related crimes when they are pleaded and sentenced all at once).
149. See Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, alid Blame: Community
Views and the Criminal Law 189-97 (Westview, 1995) (conducting an empirical study that
supported the notion of a "multiple offense discount" and noting that cumulative sentences grow
more lenient when offenses are committed closer in time).
150. See, for example, State v. Pillot, 560 A.2d 634, 643 (N.J. 1989) (noting that where
related offenses were not consolidated at the sentencing stage, the "differing attitude of each
judge toward the defendant' resulted in "idiosyncratic sentencing difference"). In order to
remedy this problem of "idiosyncratic sentencing difference," that court used its constitutional
authority to modify joinder rules so that defendants can move to consolidate related offenses at
the sentencing stage. Id.
151. Concern about disparate sentences for similar offenses underlies Congress's passage of
the Sentencing Guidelines. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221 (criticizing the "unjustifiably wide
range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, committed
under similar circumstances").
152. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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compulsory joinder in the multiple prosecutions context.15 3 In an age
when prosecutors may avoid the strictures of the multiple prosecu-
tions prohibition by seeking any number of punitive sanctions in non-
criminal proceedings, the multiple punishments rule is of paramount
importance.'5 4
V. CONCLUSION
The multiple punishments prohibition today rests on shaky
ground. The Supreme Court's articulation of the right as prohibiting
punishment greater than that authorized by the legislature no longer
explains its own application of the prohibition in Halper and Kurth
Ranch. The Court's failure to articulate a coherent principle behind
the multiple punishments prohibition makes its applications of the
doctrine appear inconsistent. In this environment, the criticisms of
those who would discard the right altogether grow harder to ignore.
Rather than simply explaining the multiple punishments
prohibition (or even discarding it altogether), the Ursery Court chose
to avoid applying its own multiple punishments rules. Ducking the
issue, however, will provide only temporary relief. As long as law
enforcement strategies continue to change and defendants face
growing exposure to punitive civil sanctions, the multiple
punishments issue will arise again. It is time for the Court to tie its
multiple punishments jurisprudence to a single double jeopardy
interest. The Court's varying applications of the right can be
understood as different ways of preserving the integrity of final
153. See note 20 and accompanying text.
154. The notion that double jeopardy policy must be defined in terms of society's criminal
procedure is not new. In his famous Comment on double jeopardy policy, Larry Simon observed:
Some of these [policy considerations] are recommended more by the realities of current
criminal procedure than by history. But no apology is in order .... For double
jeopardy, in its early days, was integral to a different society and different criminal
proceduure .... The policy and purpose of double jeopardy must be a function of the
criminal law and procedure of a social system. Double jeopardy, even when established
as a general principle, may be empty of specific content.
Comment, 75 Yale L. J. at 266 n.14 (cited in note 18).
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judgments. By thus identifying the interest that informs the rules,
the Court would clarify the operation of those rules and the harms
they were meant to redress.
Peter Michael Bryce*
* Thanks to Professor Nancy King for her helpful comments and to Tamsen Love,
Courtney Persons, and Chris Robbins for their excellent editorial assistance. I am most espe-
cially grateful to Karin Hoppmann whose contributions went far beyond her role as secondary
editor and without whom this Note would not have been possible.
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